C HINA CAN SAY “NO ”:
ANALYZING CHINA’S R EJECTION OF THE SOUTH CHINA
SEA ARBITRATION
Toward A New Era of International Law with Chinese
Characteristics
Isaac B. Kardon*
At least since the 2008 global financial crisis, the People’s Republic
of China (“PRC”) has been feeling its oats on the world stage. After
decades of “reform and opening” to ever-deeper integration into
global affairs, China is now shaping the international system as
much as that system is shaping China. The “engagement” thesis—
variations on the idea that China’s sustained participation in
interlocking Western-dominated institutions will produce a more
liberal, compliant, and cooperative China (Economy and Oksenberg
1999, Kent 2007, Johnston 2008)—is all but historical artifact.
Now equipped with ample experience and outsized capacity, China
can give as well as they get on the global stage. Operating at
impressive scale in economic, security, and diplomatic arenas,
Chinese actors and organizations are now major players who drive
the agenda. Deng Xiaoping’s dictum to never seek leadership (绝不
当头) is no longer operative as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
publicly touts China’s role as a global leader with major ambitions. 1
PRC diplomats are no longer so reticent and have announced
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1
See Xi Jinping, Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th CCP National
Congress,
XINHUA
(Nov.
4,
2017,
06:07
PM
),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/201711/04/content_34115212.htm [https://perma.cc/H233-DKF3] (stating that all
traditional Chinese communist thought must be altered to the new era of China).
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China’s intent to serve as an active agent of change within the
international order. 2
China’s influence is increasingly evident in the international legal
arena. The Fourth Plenum of the 18th National Party Congress of
the Chinese Communist Party exhorted Chinese diplomats and
scholars to “vigorously participate in the formulation of
international norms[,] . . . strengthen [China's] discourse power and
influence in international legal affairs[,] . . . [and] use legal methods
to safeguard [China's] sovereignty, security and development
interests.”3 Indeed, many international legal regimes now embody
not only Western, liberal norms and values (that the Chinese were
supposed to internalize), but Chinese norms and values as well. The
lack of normativity in the Chinese pronouncements about
international law and the overwhelming focus on its practical use as
an instrument in service of policy and in defense of sovereignty are
the most notable characteristics of China’s evolving approach to
international law.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”) is one such regime where this new Chinese intent and
capability are on vivid display. PRC’s full-throated rejection of the
arbitration brought by the Philippines under UNCLOS4 compulsory
2

See Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪), Promote the Building of a Community of Common
Destiny (Seriously Study, Propagate, and Implement the Spirit of the 19 th CCP
National Congress) (推动构建人类命运共同体(认真学习宣传贯彻党的十九大
精神)),
RENMIN
W ANG
(Nov.
19,
2017,
08:55
AM),
http://hb.people.com.cn/n2/2017/1119/c192237-30938426.html
[https://perma.cc/2CRF-HTTJ] (proclaiming that the western structure of
international law is flawed and China is confident and capable of contributing to
changes in the world).
3
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision concerning Some Major
Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the County According to the
law Forward (中共中央关于全面推进依法治国若干重大问题的决定),RENMIN
RIBAO (Oct. 29, 2014, 07:17 AM), http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1029/c6438725927606.html [https://perma.cc/YP4B-DFM7].
4
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S.
397
(entered
into
force
Nov.
16,
1994),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
[http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf]
(describing PRC’s reaction to the Philippines’ arbitration).
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dispute resolution procedures in 2013 (“The South China Sea
Arbitration”)5 marks a new high tide in China’s confidence that it
can shape the global institutions it once only grudgingly endured.
What influence will China wield on the development of the law of
the sea regime? PRC’s conduct and rhetoric surrounding this case
provide some important insights.
In refusing outright to participate in the arbitration, China showed
itself willing and able to reject a vital component of a cornerstone
treaty of the international legal order. Beijing went further than
simply ignoring the procedure by denying the standing and
jurisdiction of the arbitral body to render binding judgments,
vowing to never implement the final award rendered on July 12,
2016, and attacking the motives and professional competence of the
arbitral body itself. With some irony, this is the same UNCLOS
treaty China had ratified some twenty years prior in full exercise of
its sovereignty; meanwhile, the supposed custodian of that
international legal order, the United States, remains unlikely to
ratify (despite enthusiastically backing the arbitration).
Enforcement of judgments under international law is a tall order
under any circumstance, and especially so when one of the parties
has actively sought to delegitimize the procedure. The field appears
open for China.
While some Chinese influence on legal processes will occur as a
matter of course, this case demonstrates an active and disciplined
PRC policy geared toward shaping the law of the sea, not destroying
or ignoring it. China has not rejected UNCLOS. Instead, it is
seeking to champion an UNCLOS with Chinese characteristics.
PRC officials and a large cohort of domestic and international wellwishers chastised the arbitral tribunal for what they held to be
5

See The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China, PCA CASE
Repository Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No. 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2016), https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7 [https://perma.cc/M5A5-YCBE]
(describing the previous dispute resolution procedures and how they affected the
arbitration between the Philippines and PRC). NB—this arbitration is often
incorrectly described as a Permanent Court of Arbitration or “PCA” arbitration.
The PCA in the Hague was only the registry for the proceedings, providing a
venue, clerks, and administrative support. The claim was brought under Annex
VII of UNCLOS III, and relies on jurisdiction specific to that treaty.
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inappropriate reach into a thicket of issues revolving around China’s
maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Their core arguments?
UNCLOS does not regulate the issues under dispute; international
law itself does not bear on matters of Chinese sovereignty. If
international law is deemed insufficient to solve these problems,
what exactly is the alternative China is proposing? How and why
did China go about rejecting the arbitration? What are the legal and
political consequences of this action for China, for UNCLOS, for
international dispute resolution, and for international law?
This essay addresses those questions in four stages, analyzing (I)
China’s pre-arbitration positions on UNCLOS, focusing on its
compulsory dispute resolution mechanisms, (II) China’s campaign
against the arbitration while it was underway from 2013 to 2016,
and (III) China’s reactions to the final arbitral award. Finally, I
conclude with a provisional assessment of (IV) how China’s
rejection of the arbitration has influenced regional politics and the
law of the sea regime. The South China Sea arbitration is destined
to be a seminal case in our reckoning with a risen China’s
relationship to international law. Taking careful stock at present,
the implications are troubling for the coherence, uniformity, and
legitimacy of the international legal system.
I. China’s Pre-Arbitral Stance on UNCLOS & Third-Party
Dispute Resolution
UNCLOS III was the PRC’s first major multilateral treaty as a
member of the United Nations. Prior to that, China’s official and
practical stance toward such treaties (including the first UNCLOS
treaty in 1958)6 was outright contempt, based in post-colonial
6

See Shen Weiliang, PRC Representative to the UN Seabed Committee, XINHUA
WEEKLY, 18 (Apr. 1, 1973) (stating this first multilateral effort to codify the
customary law of the sea concluded with the four 1958 Geneva Conventions on
the Law of the Sea (i.e., UNCLOS I). The People’s Republic of China did not
participate and denounced UNCLOS I as “fundamentally in the interests of the
superpowers in pursuing maritime hegemony and not to the advantage of the large
numbers of developing countries in their just struggle to defend their sovereignty
and national economic interests.”) (Shen Weiliang, PRC Representative to the UN
Seabed Committee, Xinhua Weekly (March 18, 1973)). For convenience, this
essay will refer to UNCLOS III as “UNCLOS” unless specification is required.
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nationalism and a distinctive strain of Marxism-Leninism.7 Until
China’s reform and opening, international law was regarded as an
unwelcome foreign import, forced upon China in the form of an
“Unequal Treaty System” through a series of humiliating defeats in
the long nineteenth century. The history of extraterritoriality and
other insults imposed upon China through the Western practice of
treaty-making occupies a prominent role in the national psyche. 8
Whatever the impact of these bitter, early experiences on the
Chinese rhetoric on the subject, PRC practice shows an evolutionary
change toward accepting and contributing to international law.
PRC’s volte face on the acceptability of such treaties is a
remarkable shift, and nowhere more evident than in the law of the
sea. After participating energetically throughout the long UNCLOS
negotiations (1973-1982), ratifying it in 1996, and steadily
promulgating domestic legislation based largely on the treaty’s
text,9 China’s relationship with UNCLOS appeared, on its face, like
a success story for the engagement doctrine. China was a member
in good standing of a major international legal regime, and it
seemed to be gradually internalizing its norms into its domestic law
and practice.

7

See JEROME A. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY (1974) (explaining PRC’s
attitudes toward international law); see also Jacques DeLisle, China's Approach
to International Law: A Historical Perspective, Proceedings of the Annual
Meeting, 94 AM. SOC. INT’L L. 267, 267-75 (2000) (exploring PRC’s attitude
toward international law across history).
8
Wang Jianlang (王建朗), The Record of Abolishing All Unequal Treaties in
China (中国废除不平等条约的历程)(Zhongguo Feichu bu Pingdeng Tiaoyue de
Licheng) (2000); Nanchang: Jianxi People’s Press (江西人民出版社), 2000); Lin
Quan, ed., Sources on the Relinquishment of the Unequal Treaties during the War
Resistance Period（抗战期间废除不平等条约史料)(Kangzhan Qijian Feichu bu
Pingdeng Tiaoyue Shiliao) (Period (抗战时期废除不平等条约史料) (Taibei:
Zhengzhong shuju, 1984).
9
See Isaac Kardon, China’s Maritime Interests and the Law of the Sea:
Domesticating Public International Law, in 12 CHINA’S SOCIALIST RULE OF LAW
REFORMS UNDER XI JINPING 179 (John Garrick & Yan Chang Bennett eds., New
York: Routledge, 2016) (explaining China’s law reforms relating to international
law).
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Closer inquiry, however, demonstrates that PRC never internalized
core norms essential to the treaty’s functionality. Among them, two
stand out as most relevant to this arbitration. First, China does not
accept that the rights and jurisdiction codified in UNCLOS III
should extinguish or supersede rights and jurisdiction based on other
sources. In this case, China bases its claims to some 80% of the
water space of the South China Sea upon “historical rights” that it
refuses to define. Second, China purports to exclude from
compulsory dispute resolution some of the central issues for which
that mechanism was designed. Here, the Chinese demand bilateral
diplomatic “negotiation and consultation” instead of third-party
dispute-resolution prescribed in the Convention.
In both instances, addressed in detail below, China reconciles
inconvenient parts of UNCLOS with PRC policy through tortured
interpretations of the treaty. This mode of interpretation treats
UNCLOS as fundamentally indeterminate and far from
comprehensive. In so doing, China’s advocates grant a wide berth
to extravagant PRC claims to rights and jurisdiction not
contemplated by the other parties to the Convention.
Correspondingly, China’s stance on compulsory dispute resolution
effectively denies the authority of the international community to
adjudicate or otherwise restrict those unique claims. This section
analyzes each of these issues to establish a “baseline” description of
China’s position from which to assess PRC’s subsequent actions
surrounding the arbitration.
China’s “Historical Rights” and Other Excessive Claims in the
South China Sea
PRC was willing to ratify UNCLOS III despite several clear
disadvantages posed by the new treaty. The final text had to be
accepted as a “package deal,” 10 meaning any state seeking the rights
and jurisdiction conferred by the treaty took on all of the
corresponding obligations.
Chinese policymakers understood
10

See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 309 (Dec.10, 1982),
1833 U.N.T.S. 397. (whereas some treaties allow parties to issue “reservations”
that exempt them from one or more elements of the treaty, Article 309 of
UNCLOS categorically denies this right).
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clearly and in advance that certain “contradictions” between the
clear black letters of the treaty and the broad, undefined nature of
China’s maritime claims would inevitably cause some friction.11
Yet PRC has never relinquished its extra-UNCLOS claims, and has,
in fact, augmented them since ratifying. 12 This process is possible
because China’s domestic legal institutions do not necessarily bind
the state to its international legal obligations. Lax and underinstitutionalized legal rules permit ad hoc and opportunistic
interpretations to prevail where international law comes into conflict
with policy.13
The PRC’s “excessive claims” 14 are most evident in the South
China Sea. Among them are (1) straight baselines around all PRCclaimed territory, regardless of whether they satisfy the
requirements of Article 7;15 (2) archipelagic baselines drawn around
the Paracel Islands (and by inference, the Spratly Islands), which are
entitled at most to individual sets of baselines around each feature;
(3) a host of restrictions on navigation (notably, on innocent passage
through territorial seas and military activities in EEZs); and finally,
(4) the notorious “nine-dashed line” map that represents some form
11

See Song Yann-Huei & Zou Keyuan, Maritime Legislation of Mainland China
and Taiwan: Developments, Comparison, Implications, and Potential Challenges
for the United States, 31 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 303, 308-09 (2000) (discussing
why the Vice-Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing thought PRC should ratify UNCLOS.
Addressing the Standing Committee of the Eighth PRC National People’s
Congress shortly before the ratification, he listed four pros and four cons to
joining the convention, arguing that the former outweighed the latter).
12
See Kardon, supra note 9 (discussing PRC’s ambitious domestic legal efforts to
augment its maritime rights, which would be seen as unlawful by any reasonable
interpretation of UNCLOS).
13
See Xue Hanqin & Jin Qian, International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic
Legal System, 8.2. CHINESE J. INT’L L. 299, 300 (2009) (discussing the loophole
in Chinese Constitution and basic laws that “do not contain any provision on the
legal status of international treaties and their hierarchy in the domestic legal
system”).
14
See J. ASHLEY ROACH, ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS (3rd
ed. 2012) (offering the comprehensive, if U.S.-determined, accounting of which
maritime claims do not comport with the law of the sea and why).
15
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 7.1 (Dec.10, 1982),
1833 U.N.T.S. 397. (specifying limited conditions under which straight baselines
may be drawn, namely “where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.”).
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of sovereignty and “historic rights” claim to most of the South
China Sea.16 While there are other ways to characterize PRC’s
claims, this minimal accounting establishes that there are multiple
elements of Chinese interpretation and application of the law of the
sea that are likely to come into conflict with that of other states.
Image 1: China’s “Nine-Dashed Line”17 as submitted to the UN

16

See Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea:
History, Status and Implications, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 98, 108 (Beijing: Haiyang,
2014) (offering the most careful and comprehensive Chinese accounting for how
this claim, however defined, might entitle the PRC to some maritime rights not
included in UNCLOS).
17
See “Note Verbale,” from People’s Republic of China, “Note Verbale,”
submitted to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf
(May
7,
2009),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_
vnm.pdf [https://perma.cc/96UH-6B39] (stating China’s position of indisputable
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea).
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That nine-dashed line claim is the most easily recognizable (see
Image 1 above) and consequential of the PRC’s various claims, and
one that is plainly at odds with some basic norms of the Convention.
For one, the treaty expressly establishes a geographic basis for
maritime entitlements.
All maritime rights and jurisdiction
conferred under the Convention (which is framed as a
comprehensive “constitution for the world’s oceans”) are a function
of proximity to sovereign land territory (la terre domine la mer).
Any historical claim not based on geography is in theory superseded
by an agreed geographic system for distributing rights to coastal
states. Thus, certain of China’s claims to maritime space on the
basis of some historical usage contradict the basic intent and
purposes of UNCLOS III—and especially the EEZ regime.
In effect, the nine-dashed line deprives all of the other coastal states
in the South China Sea of EEZ resource rights and jurisdiction.
Although there is no domestic legislation establishing the basis of
this claim, PRC’s 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and
Continental Shelf creates the statutory possibility for a “historical
rights” claim in stating that “the provisions in this Law shall not
affect the rights that PRC has been enjoying ever since the past.”18
This indeterminate, historical argument for, in effect, exempting
itself from the EEZ regime looms large in China’s efforts to deny
the authority of the UNCLOS tribunal to render judgment on
China’s claims. The Philippines launched its suit against China in
large part to put the question of the legality of that line to the
judgment of the international community.
Downplaying the Role of Third-Party Dispute Resolution
China maintains a principled opposition to mandatory dispute
resolution procedures. PRC legal scholars have been asserting as
much since at least the early 1960s: where sovereignty is
implicated, “it is never possible to seek a settlement from any
18

Zhuanshu Jingjiqu he Dalujia Fa (专属经济区和大陆架法专属经济区与大陆
架法) [Law of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., ( effective June 26, 1998), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200712/11/content_1383573.htm [https://perma.cc/RG3K-AGQJ].
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form of international arbitration.” 19 This rejection emerges from
some combination of opportunism, weak domestic legal
institutions, and the bitter legacy of extraterritoriality and other
infringements on Chinese sovereignty. While blanket opposition
to international arbitration is no longer in effect (e.g., China’s
growing and effective use of the WTO arbitration system), 20 the
vestiges of that hostile attitude remain in the PRC’s current
practice. Given the tacit invitation to arbitrate manifested in
China’s excessive maritime claims, and their plausible bearing on
sovereignty, it is not at all surprising that PRC would seek to
exclude itself from the Philippines’ suit.
In respect of the law of the sea, China made its views on this issue
known during the negotiations of the Conference. The leading
international legal scholar on the Chinese delegation, Wang Tieya,
made his only official comment to the plenary group on the
subject of dispute resolution, stating that a compulsory and
binding dispute resolution procedure is a non-starter.21 This
opposition meant that the PRC did not entirely embrace the
“package deal” of UNCLOS when it ratified in 1996. Instead, by
including several reservations in its signing statement, China
signaled that it would not fully accept the dispute resolution
procedures of Part XV. Among those reservations, China
announced that it “will effect, through consultations” resolution
on maritime boundary issues.22 In so doing, it acted in breach of
the clear prohibition on excluding any part of the Convention

19

Gao Yuanping, International Dispute Settlement, in GUOJI FA (国际法)
[International Law] 611-12, (Wang Tieya ed., Beijing: Law Press, 1995).
20
Gregory Shaffer & Henry Gao, China’s Rise: How it Took on the U.S. at the
WTO, 1 U. OF ILLINOIS L. REV. 115, 132 (Jan. 2018).
21
See UNCLOS III Official Documents, A/CONF.62/SR.112 (listing Wang
Tieya’s comment).
22
See United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea,
Declarations
and
Statements
(1996),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm
#China Upon ratification [https://perma.cc/P6VH-739N] (NB—in 2006, China
opted to exempt itself from certain forms of compulsory dispute resolution—
including boundary delimitation—by evoking Article 298. Had PRC exercised
this possibility in 1996 upon ratification, there would have been no obvious
breach of Article 309).
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(Article 309), signaling an a la carte approach to interpreting and
applying the treaty’s rules.
This emphasis on dialogue and consultation in lieu of formal
dispute resolution is a central component of PRC’s modern
practice of international law. In 2013, PRC’s UN Ambassador to
the UNGA Sixth Committee (on legal affairs) offered the official
statement, “[t]he Chinese government actively upholds peaceful
settlement of disputes, and proposes to settle international disputes
properly through negotiation, dialogue and consultation.” 23 This
statement is significant for its omission of “arbitration and judicial
settlement,” listed in Article 33(1) of the UN Charter24 as
available options for international dispute resolution. Those
procedures are by no means mandatory, but it is notable that
China has a priori excluded them from consideration in dealing
with international disputes.25 A jealous regard for sovereign
prerogatives is a key principle in PRC practice of international
law.
These two positions—maintaining excessive, undefined claims
and excluding mandatory arbitration that might limit them—
prefigure the PRC’s reaction to the Philippines’ arbitration. They
reflect certain national interests that Beijing is unwilling to
subordinate to international law, a posture not uncommon among
great powers.26 Further, and more specific to the Chinese case,
they represent a principled rejection of authoritative decisions
23

H.E. Ambassador Wang Min, From Chinese Mission to the United Nations,
Address Before the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly (Oct. 10, 2013),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t108
7085.shtml [https://perma.cc/MK9Y-NPWY].
24
U.N. Charter art. 33, ¶1, http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/
[https://perma.cc/JQ2C-Y764].
25
Julian Ku, China’s Definition of the “Peaceful Settlement of International
Disputes” Leaves Out International Adjudication, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 15, 2013,
12:53 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/15/obligation-seek-peaceful-settlementinternational-disputes-include-international-adjudication/
[https://perma.cc/7DMD-2CXZ].
26
See Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International
Law, 52. HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2011) (refuting the American exceptionalism
underlying the American stance toward international law by comparing the case
of China, the European Nation, and the United States).
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rendered outside of Beijing’s sovereign control. Whatever the
many causes of this acute preoccupation with sovereignty, it has
distinct consequences for the effectiveness of international legal
regimes largely predicated on making certain binding demands of
sovereign states.
The overwhelming imperative for the Chinese party-state to
exercise control manifests in the sequence of official and semiofficial reactions to the South China Sea Arbitration. At an early
stage, PRC statements sought to diminish the importance of the
law of the sea as the sole authoritative source of law,
subordinating it to historical factors as well as other bodies of law.
Following a principled commitment to “inviolable Chinese
sovereignty” that brooks no meaningful penetration by
international law, China reserved the right to interpret the rules
according to its domestic priorities, with only minimal regard for
international consequences.
II. Struggling Against an “Illegitimate” Arbitration
In January of 2013, the Republic of the Philippines Ministry of
Foreign Affairs filed a Statement and Notification of Claim under
Article 287 and Annex VII of UNCLOS III. 27 The Philippines
opted to pursue UNCLOS arbitration as a final option after the
PRC had seized the Scarborough Shoal in the spring of 2012. In
evicting Philippine fishermen and law enforcement from a
disputed feature in the South China Sea that both states had
tenuously shared for decades, China catalyzed another round of a
vain international frenzy over its “assertiveness.”28 U.S. efforts to
27

REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NOTIFICATION
STATEMENT AND CLAIM. NO. 13-0211 (2013), http://www.philippineembassyusa.org/uploads/pdfs/embassy/2013/2013-0122Notification%20and%20Statement%20of%20Claim%20on%20West%20Philippi
ne%20Sea.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6C3-M2T8].
28
This “assertiveness” trope began in 2009 and has continued through the present.
Several analysts weighed in on the degree to which it was properly labeled,
though all agree that the Scarborough Shoal incident could not be considered
otherwise. See Michael Swaine & Taylor Fravel, China’s Assertive Behavior—
Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” Periphery, 35 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR
(2011),
http://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-assertive-behavior-part-twoOF
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mediate and stand down the Chinese at Scarborough in the spring
of 2012 were ineffectual, as were bilateral Sino-Philippines
efforts to deescalate and return to the status quo ante. 29 Chinese
law enforcement vessels remained at the shoal and excluded the
once-routine operation of Philippine fishing vessels in around the
shoal. This failure, compounded by decades of incremental
Chinese gains at their expense, led the Philippine leadership to
launch proceedings under the compulsory arbitration provisions
of UNCLOS—this despite no reasonable expectation China
would willingly comply.
Still, as a party to the Convention, China was and remains legally
bound to honor the arbitral award. Because consent for
compulsory arbitration was granted in ratification, the mechanism
established in UNCLOS Part XV does not require both parties to
appear before the tribunal for its decision to be final and
binding.30 Despite some of the PRC’s objections to the
Philippines’ standing and the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the power to
determine legal obligation plainly lies with the UNCLOS body

maritime-periphery [https://perma.cc/5YJK-LEX9] (assessing China’s maritime
policy in terms of how assertive PRC has become in resolving both disputed and
undisputed maritime territories); Michael Yahuda, China’s New Assertiveness in
the South China Sea, 22 J. CONTEMP. CHINA (ISSUE) 81, 446 (2013) (explaining
China’s heightened nationalism and assertiveness in promoting its claims in South
China Sea); Alastair Iain Johnston, How New and Assertive Is China’s New
Assertiveness, 37 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 7 (2013) (critiquing the concept of
Chinese diplomacy’s “new assertiveness” by evaluating seven recent cases where
Chinese diplomacy shows consistent, or even moderate, reaction to international,
diplomatic claims, except where maritime disputes are involved).
29
MICHAEL GREEN ET AL., CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, COUNTERING
COERCION IN MARITIME ASIA: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF GRAY ZONE
DETERRENCE
95-123
(2017),
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/170505_GreenM_CounteringCoercionAsia_Web.pdf?OnoJXf
Wb4A5gw_n6G.8azgEd8zRIM4wq [https://perma.cc/8DJH-PEG6].
30
Article 296 establishes the binding and final nature of an award rendered under
the compulsory dispute resolution procedures of UNCLOS III. Part XV, Annex
VII, Article 9 explicitly states that a default of appearance “shall not constitute a
bar to the proceedings” while Article 11 in that section affirms an award’s
finality.
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that arbitrated the case. 31 China immediately and forcefully
rejected this obligation nonetheless, and presented its arguments
to the court of public opinion rather than to the arbitrators.
Two Arguments and One Prescription
The thrust of Chinese statements throughout the three and a half
years of the arbitral process was constant. It can be distilled to
two arguments and one prescription that flows from them. The
first argument is that the Philippines took China to arbitration
solely as a political exercise to deny China’s rightful “maritime
rights and interests” and “internationalize” the disputes. China’s
opposition, therefore, was undertaken to uphold the legal regime
of the law of the sea against this alleged abuse. Second, Chinese
spokespeople argued that the Philippines’ complaints fell beyond
the scope of the Convention or were ruled out as subjects of
arbitration by the Convention itself. They reasoned that a broader
set of considerations—including general and customary
international law as well as vague consideration of history—
rightly govern the disputes. Of course, such factors cannot be
adjudicated in an UNCLOS forum and therefore demand
alternative modes of dispute resolution.
These two arguments yield a policy prescription from Beijing
about how to manage disputes: bilateral “dialogue and
consultation” (对话协商). Whereas any state can have recourse
to international legal means at any time as an exercise of its
sovereignty, China counseled the Philippines to forego this right
and instead to pursue a diplomatic approach (despite
disadvantages intrinsic to dealing directly with a far larger
power). This prescription broadcasts a signal to any other small
state that might seek to punch above its weight in seeking legal
remedy against China, negating any leverage international law
may offer.32 China’s insistence on this approach tracks its general
31

See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 288 (Dec. 10, 1982),
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (“In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has
jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled my decision of that court or tribunal.”).
32
As will be discussed in the concluding section, Vietnam is the proximate target
of this signal. The Vietnamese government submitted a Note Verbale and a
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attitude on the highly limited nature of international law. Any
authoritative third-party judgment on its maritime claims is
anathema to the PRC approach to these disputes. Specifically, the
determinate nature of an award would radically narrow the
possibilities for China’s excessive claims. Informed Chinese
recognized that Beijing’s legal strategy is to precisely avoid any
determination of the nature and scope of its claims, and thus to
retain the maximum flexibility to conduct diplomacy.33
The proceeding section examines PRC’s official statements over
the course of the arbitration, as well as notable commentaries
from Chinese and sympathetic foreign scholars. The legal (or
logical) validity of the claims from either side of the case is not
under scrutiny. Rather, the aim is to analyze China’s response,
showing its attitude toward (and possible influence on) the
international law of the sea.
China Can Say “No No No No!”
Within days of the Philippines’ Statement and Notification of
Claim, PRC officially rejected the entire procedure with extreme
prejudice. The Philippines sought relief for fifteen alleged
Chinese violations of its obligations under UNCLOS, ranging
from the validity of China’s “historic rights” to lapsed
seamanship and poor environmental stewardship. 34
The
Philippines’ claims had been crafted by skilled UNCLOS lawyers
in the Philippines and Foley Hoag LLP, an experienced private
law firm in Washington, D.C. Their submissions scrupulously
avoided treading on questions of territorial sovereignty and
statement of interest in the case to the tribunal, requested official materials, and
sent an official delegation to observe the proceedings. See PCA, The South China
Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China),
Judgment, P.C.A. No. 2013-9 (Oct. 29) (explaining Vietnam’s movements against
China).
33
Interviews by Author in Hainan, Beijing, and Shanghai (2014).
34
After submission of the Notification and Statement of Claim, the arbitral body
was formed, and formal procedures adopted. The Philippines submitted a
Memorial setting out fifteen submissions on which they sought relief. See The
South China Sea Arbitration, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.
(providing a thorough recounting of all the stages of the process).
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boundary delimitation, which would fall outside of the tribunal’s
competence. Instead, the submissions hinged on the question of
maritime entitlements—that is, the type and extent of jurisdiction
and rights that UNCLOS permits states to claim from the
sovereign territory, not the status of the sovereign territory per se.
Nonetheless, the Chinese riposte protested the underlying
sovereignty issues: “[t]he key and root of the dispute over the
South China Sea between China and the Philippines is territorial
disputes”35 announced the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) on the day of the claim. China did not abandon this
premise that the arbitration implicated sovereignty claims
throughout the nearly four years of hearings and deliberation held
at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague.36
On February 19, the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
publicized a fixed legal and policy position on the matter in a Note
Verbale to the Philippines. That position summarized as “Four
Nos:” (1) no acceptance, (2) no participation, (3) no recognition,
and (4) no implementation (不接受, 不参, 不承认, 不执行).37 By
several accounts from Chinese legal scholars, this outright refusal to
honor any aspect of the procedure now underway was a knee-jerk
reaction from central leadership. Confronted with the prospect of
legitimizing an arbitration likely to go poorly for China, the
consensus view among the leadership in Beijing was to attack the
legal process itself and punish the Philippines for its
“insubordination.”38 China did not formally participate in any part
35

China Reiterates Islands Claim After Philippine UN Move (Jan. 23, 2013)
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21163507 [https://perma.cc/FVS9-X3T2].
36
NB—The arbitration was not a “PCA arbitration,” despite the frequent citation
as such in the press. The PCA served as the registry for the arbitration, providing
the venue, clerks, and administrative work necessary to conduct a complex
international arbitration. The legal force of the ruling, the process by which the
arbitrators were selected, as well as the source of their jurisdiction are solely a
product of UNCLOS (specifically Part XV, Section 2, which provides
“Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions,” and Annex VII which
details the default arbitration procedures).
37
Press Release, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1014798.shtml
[https://perma.cc/K56K-D9PL].
38
Interviews by Author in Hainan and Beijing (April–December 2014).
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of the procedure. It neglected to appoint an arbitrator, declined to
argue on its own behalf, and failed to submit documents and
evidence that might have disposed the arbitrators more favorably to
its counterclaims. However, China did mount a large-scale public
relations campaign surrounding the arbitration, seeking support
within the international community for its interpretation of
UNCLOS and the role of international law in international disputes.
China’s categorical rejection of the arbitration process is best
captured in a “Position Paper” published by the MFA in
December of 2014. 39 The arguments put forward in the Position
Paper were a composite of an all-hands-on-deck effort from
lawyers and analysts throughout China’s highly integrated
government and think-tank community.40 While it was not
submitted directly to the arbitrators, the PRC published its
statement not long before the deadline to officially submit
materials in response to the Philippines claim. It was ultimately
considered officially by the tribunal as a plea and informed the
decision to bifurcate the proceedings into separate jurisdiction and
merits phases.41 In it, China’s diplomats offered three principal
reasons that the arbitral tribunal should not find jurisdiction. Each
endeavors to confound the arbitral process by introducing novel
elements of China’s claims and diplomatic history that do not
admit of interpretation under the Convention.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Position Paper
on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the
Republic
of
the
Philippines
(Dec.
7,
2014),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm
[https://perma.cc/GRG9-NYGL] [hereinafter Position Paper].
40
LOUIS B. SOHN & JOHN E. NOYES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA (2004). The author attended fifteen separate workshops, conferences, and
meetings concerning the arbitration during the period April–December 2014, in
which experts (and non-experts) discussed the various components of the Chinese
objection and “perfected” them in reports that were sent directly to MFA.
41
The Republic of the Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA Case
2013-9, Procedural Order No. 4 (Apr. 21, 2015), In the Matter of an Arbitration
before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“Convention”) (Permanent Court of
Arbitration Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1807
[https://perma.cc/E334-WZDZ].
39
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Sovereignty is a non-starter. The Position Paper’s first argument
is that “[t]he essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the
territorial sovereignty over several maritime features in the South
China Sea, which is beyond the scope of the Convention and does
not concern the interpretation or application of the Convention.” 42
The Convention authorizes an arbitral body (there are several
choices in Part XV and Annexes for how it is to be constituted) to
rule on “interpretation and application” of the Convention as
regards the case under consideration. Because the Convention
treats only matters maritime, the more fundamental questions of
territorial sovereignty is obviously excluded from the jurisdiction
of any arbitral body formed pursuant to the treaty.
The Position Paper claims that the Philippines acted in bad faith,
smuggling in a sovereignty dispute under the guise of questions of
maritime entitlement. “The Philippines,” the paper alleges,
is well aware that a tribunal . . . of the Convention
has no jurisdiction over territorial sovereignty
disputes. In an attempt to circumvent this
jurisdictional hurdle and fabricate a basis for
institution of arbitral proceedings, the Philippines
has cunningly packaged its case in the present
form . . . This contrived packaging, however, fails
to conceal the very essence of the subject-matter
of the arbitration, namely, the territorial
sovereignty over certain maritime features in the
South China Sea.43

Recognizing that there is no explicit request for a decision on
sovereignty, the PRC paper parses the Philippines’ claims against
it, citing the impossibility of ruling on entitlements if the
underlying sovereignty questions are undetermined. 44
China is arguably justified in recognizing that ultimately, virtually
all questions of “interpretation and application” of the treaty rely
on some determination of sovereignty. Without sovereignty
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, supra note39.
Id. at ¶14.
44
Id. at ¶15.
42
43
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prefiguring a claim, there is no possibility of maritime jurisdiction
of any sort. However, following this logic, the tribunal would
lack the authority to make virtually any decision whatsoever—an
obvious absurdity. From the Chinese legal standpoint, however,
there is nothing absurd about this. “Whatever logic is to be
followed, only after the extent of China’s territorial sovereignty in
the South China Sea is determined can a decision be made on
whether China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea have
exceeded the extent allowed in the Convention.” 45 This high bar
for admissibility would preclude most use of compulsory dispute
resolution, consistent with China’s stated preferences.
By a way of reinforcing the claim that sovereignty is necessarily
implicated, the Position Paper issued the PRC’s clearest statement
to date about the nature of its sovereignty claims to the Spratly
Islands.46 Among other clarifying effects, this statement confirms
that China’s 2011 Note Verbale, which was addressed to Secretary
General of the United Nations, intentionally referred to the Spratly
Islands in the singular form. 47 China evidently considers them a
geographic unity for the purposes of sovereign title and maritime
entitlements. 48 The Position Paper denounces the Philippines
specification of individual features occupied by China as “an
attempt at denying China’s sovereignty over the Nansha [Spratly]
Islands as a whole.” This claim to the “islands as a whole,” or as
a “dependent archipelago” in the words of one U.S. law of the sea
specialist,49 is among the several creative efforts employed by
Chinese lawyers and diplomats to confound the application of the
45

Id. at ¶10.

Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations,
Note Verbale, No. CML/8/2011 (Apr. 14, 2011).
48
Among other clarifying effects, this statement confirms that China’s 2011 Note
Verbale addressed to Secretary General of the United Nations intentionally
referred to the Spratly Islands in the singular form; China evidently considers
them a geographic unity for the purposes of sovereign title and maritime
entitlements. Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations, Note Verbale,
No. CML/8/2011 (Apr. 14, 2011).
49
J. Ashley Roach, Dependent Archipelagos Enclosed by Straight Baselines: an
Excessive Claim?, 49.3 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. (forthcoming 2018) (draft on file
with author).
47
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Convention to its claims. In describing the features as an
archipelago (群岛), or collection of intrinsically linked islands,
PRC attempted to reconfigure the demands facing the arbitrators.
Instead of ruling on the status of individual features, the tribunal
would have to consider the whole cluster of hundreds of rocks,
reefs, atolls, and sandbars controlled in part by China, Taiwan,
Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines before reaching any
judgments. Naturally, if this argument were to be admitted,
judgment on anything concerning the Spratly Islands would be
impossible in an UNCLOS court trying a bilateral claim.
The Position Paper adduces an additional reason that sovereignty
is implicated in the Philippines’ claim. Namely, two of the
Philippines submissions (numbers four and six) ask the tribunal to
determine whether or not a given feature is in fact a naturally
formed island under Article 121, or a “low-tide elevation,” which
cannot be the subject of a sovereign title. “Whether low-tide
elevations can be appropriated as territory is in itself a question of
territorial sovereignty, not a matter concerning the interpretation
or application of the Convention. The Convention is silent on this
issue of appropriation.”50 Alongside the “archipelago” argument,
this stands as another effort to confound the application of the
treaty to the case at hand. In this case, the Chinese appeal to gaps
in general international law for making determinations about
appropriation of low-tide elevations. 51
This line of reasoning regarding sovereignty rests on the two core
arguments introduced above, namely that the Philippines abused
international law to pursue a political agenda, and that they are
asking an UNCLOS body to arbitrate a matter that falls beyond its
competence. The Position Paper enjoins the reader to consider
that China has been unjustly maligned for breaches of its
obligations. Instead, it is “the Philippines [that] contravenes the
general principles of international law and international
jurisprudence on the settlement of international maritime

50

Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶25.
Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶25 (citing Qatar v. Bahrain, ICJ 2001 and
Nicaragua v. Columbia, ICJ 2012).
51
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disputes.”52 This argumentation goes well beyond what would be
necessary to establish a jurisdictional exception, and instead
moves to reposition China as the champion of international law.
This interpretation is developed at length throughout the Position
Paper.
The Philippines does not enjoy the right to bring a suit against
China. The second line of attack in the Position Paper is again
directed at the Philippines’ supposed bad faith in launching the
arbitration. In this instance, the fault lies in the Philippines failure
to satisfy China’s standards for diplomatic negotiation prior to
pursuing arbitration. “There exists an agreement between China
and the Philippines to settle their disputes in the SCS through
negotiations, and the Philippines is debarred from unilaterally
initiating compulsory arbitration.”53 The notion of “unilateral”
use of a compulsory mechanism betrays a basic disregard for the
Philippines’ rights as a party to the multilateral treaty that
established this mandatory procedure. Nonetheless, China’s
explicit position is that the Philippines is obliged to consult with
China before undertaking a sovereign decision to launch an
arbitration on the basis of agreements concluded outside of the
treaty framework. The crux of this claim is that UNCLOS is not
the appropriate instrument for handling this dispute, and is, in fact,
superseded by the record of Sino-Philippines diplomacy.
In the Chinese interpretation, the Philippines had previously
renounced its rights under the Convention over the course of
several diplomatic agreements with China. This process of
renouncing its right to “unilaterally” seek a legal remedy began,
according to PRC, with agreements following the first (unilateral)
Chinese seizure of the Philippine-held territory in the Spratlys, at
Mischief Reef in 1995. Following this flare-up, the parties issued
a joint statement in which they “agreed to abide by” certain norms
“with a view to eventually negotiate a settlement of the bilateral
disputes.”54 Citing chapter and verse of the nations’ subsequent
and extensive bilateral and multilateral diplomatic intercourse
52

Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶29.
Position Paper, supra note 39 at Heading III.
54
Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶31.
53
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over the past two decades, the Position Paper identifies a range of
hortatory statements that “establish an obligation between the two
countries”55 to resolve their disputes through “dialogue and
consultation.” PRC holds that these agreements, collectively,
should constitute a bar on compulsory dispute resolution.
One of the principal sources that China cites as evidence of the
Philippines’s lack of grounds for launching the suit is the 2002
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(DOC), which states in paragraph four that “[t]he Parties
concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional
disputes by peaceful means . . . through friendly consultations and
negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance
with universally recognized principles of international law,
including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.” 56 As
the signatories well knew at the time, such hortatory statements
were hardly binding—nor even specific enough to rule out all
manner of adversarial action. Ironically, China was a staunch
opponent of the DOC being considered a binding legal
instrument,57 yet cites it here as part of a diplomatic pattern that,
in aggregate, constitutes a binding agreement.
That such diplomatic statements should override treaty obligations
can be explained by China’s position on the narrow effective
scope of UNCLOS. It shows a disregard for the difference
between political statements of intent and legal contracts—at least
where such a distinction puts China at a disadvantage. In Chinese
domestic law, this is indeed a distinction without a difference.
PRC’s 1990 Law on the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties
(Treaty Law) does not distinguish between “treaties” and

55

Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶38.
ASEAN, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,
http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-southchina-sea-2 [https://perma.cc/4Y7G-NYWU].
57
“The existence of the U-shaped line may be one of the reasons why China has
been reluctant to sign a legally binding code of conduct with the ASEAN
countries,” notes an UNCLOS scholar typically supportive of Chinese claims.
Zou Keyuan, China’s U-Shaped Line in the South China Sea Revisited, 43 OCEAN
DEV. & INT’L L. 18, 24 (2012).
56
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“important agreements” nor provide a standard for “important.” 58
The determination of which agreements will count as “important”
(and thus entail legal obligations on par with formal treaties) is
left entirely to the PRC State Council, the executive cabinet of the
Chinese state. This statute authorizes the state to undertake ad
hoc decisions about which agreements will count as legally
binding.59 Where convenient, non-legal, non-binding joint press
statements (like those cited in the Position Paper) may outweigh
ratified treaties.
A Chinese exemption under the Convention. The Position Paper
advances a final set of claims to further diminish the effective
scope of UNCLOS. “Even assuming, arguendo, that the subjectmatter of the arbitration were concerned with interpretation or
application of the Convention, that subject-matter would still be
an integral part of maritime delimitation and, having been
excluded by the 2006 Declaration filed by China, could not be
submitted for arbitration”. 60 The “2006 Declaration” refers to
China’s additional submission to its signing statement, taken
pursuant to Article 298, that excludes certain categories of dispute
from compulsory arbitration. 61 Among those excluded categories
is maritime boundary delimitation, which the Position Paper
alleges is also necessarily implicated by the Philippines’ claim.

58

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dijie Tiaoyue Chengxu Fa (中华人民共和国缔
结条约程序法) [Law of the People's Republic of China on the Procedure of the
Conclusion of Treaties] (art. 2, promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's
Cong.,
effective
Dec.
28,
1990), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383893.htm
[http://perma.cc/A7SY-2WES].
59
For example, PRC has determined that the series of bilateral communiques
between the U.S. and China have achieved equal status to treaties, even though
these agreements oblige China to accept a continued U.S.-Taiwan relationship,
otherwise anathema to the Chinese Communist Party. ZHONGGUO DA BAIKE
QUANSHU: LAW (中国大百科全书：法学) [ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINA: LAW] 195
(Encyclopedia of China Editorial Bd. ed., 1984).
60
Position Paper, supra note 39 at Heading IV.
61
U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Declarations and
Statements,
China
Upon
ratification
(Jun.
7,
1996),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm
[https://perma.cc/7U8W-S9CZ].
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Again, however, the absurdity of making all possible linkages
among the clearly interlinked elements of the law of the sea
regime shines through. Questions about one substantive issue in
the law of the sea can be made to bear upon virtually any other
substantive area, provided sufficient leeway to make logical
connections. If this logic were applied universally, no compulsory
dispute resolution could exist because all questions would have
vestigial elements of sovereignty or maritime boundary
delimitation. In arguing against jurisdiction on this count, PRC
strikes another blow at the efficacy of the dispute resolution
procedures in the Convention. Further, it again alleges that the
Philippines acted with bad-faith political motives “[t]o cover up
the maritime delimitation nature of the China-Philippines dispute
and to sidestep China’s 2006 declaration.”62 The “cover up,” as it
were, is the act of smuggling certain discrete questions that have
bearing on maritime delimitation such that “a so-called ‘legal
interpretation’ on each of them” 63 “would amount to a de facto
maritime delimitation.”64 The Philippines’ submissions include
issues that have been considered in previous, successful maritime
boundary delimitations; ergo, the Paper reasons, the Philippines
are simply seeking a backdoor to achieve maritime delimitation.
The Position Paper further alleges political motives in the
Philippines failure to consult with China in advance to discover
whether the issues in dispute were, in China’s view, covered under
its Article 298 declaration. Without such diplomatic overtures,
it could be well imagined that any of the disputes
listed in article 298 may be submitted to the
compulsory procedures under section 2 of Part
XV simply by connecting them . . . with the
question of interpretation or application of certain
provisions of the Convention. Should the above
approach be deemed acceptable, the question
would then arise as to whether the provisions of
Article 298 could still retain any value, and
whether there is any practical meaning left of the
62

Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶65.
Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶65.
64
Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶69.
63
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declarations so far filed by 35 States Parties under
Article 298.65

PRC thus positions itself as the defender of the Convention
against abuses that, if taken to their logical extreme, would
undermine the functioning of the treaty.
China’s mode of championing the treaty, however, is largely to
spare it from functioning at all in issues of any political import. In
concluding the Position Paper, the Chinese argued that the South
China Sea issue “is compounded by complex historical
background and sensitive political factors . . . China always
maintains that the parties concerned shall seek proper ways and
means of settlement through consultations and negotiations on the
basis of respect for historical facts and international law.”66 This
valedictory statement recaps the basic thrust of the Position Paper:
sovereignty is too politically sensitive to legally adjudicate;
UNCLOS has a narrow scope; and the only appropriate means of
resolution runs through bilateral diplomacy with Beijing.
Although it was not formally submitted, the arbitral tribunal
elected to “treat the Position Paper and certain communications
from China as constituting, in effect, a plea concerning
jurisdiction.”67 Taken in sum, PRC objections in the Position
Paper reflect long-standing positions and modes of interpretation
on the law of the sea—even if they also appear cynically
convenient in this case. Especially where issues of sovereignty
are implicated, we should expect China to reject all modes of
third-party dispute resolution. More significant and surprising,
perhaps, are the various arguments intended to narrow the scope
of substantive issues which may be arbitrated under the
Convention. If claims to jurisdiction and sovereign rights that rely
on vague historical claims and appeals to “general international
law” were to fall beyond the writ of the Convention, as argued in
65

Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶74.
Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶92.
67
The Republic of the Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, Case No.
2013-19, Arbitration Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2015), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506 [https://perma.cc/362BCYCS].
66
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the Chinese paper, the capacity of the treaty to regulate maritime
claims and activities would be radically curtailed.
Recruiting Support Among Chinese and Foreign Legal Experts
Despite China’s principled rejection of the process, the arbitral
tribunal explicitly considered the Chinese arguments about
jurisdiction in its deliberations, electing to bifurcate its procedure
into jurisdictional and merits awards. In the October 2015 award
on jurisdiction and admissibility, the arbitrators found jurisdiction
over seven of the fifteen Philippine submissions, and withheld
determination on jurisdiction for the remaining eight depending
on consideration of the facts during the merits phase (and
clarification of one submission deemed too general). This
decision guaranteed that an award on the merits was forthcoming
and inspired a PRC-directed campaign to delegitimize the
arbitration, the arbitrators, and the various parties purportedly
conspiring against China.
Given the high probability of an adverse award, the ensuing public
relations campaign was swift and pointed. A cottage industry of
South China Sea arbitration law books and articles, a sudden
flurry of masters and doctoral theses, and a lively conference
circuit all emerged during this period.68 Each of the arguments in
the December 2014 Position Paper found enthusiastic advocates
throughout China’s commentariat and academy. These took the
form of ad hominem media attacks on the arbitrators,69 attempted
ex parte contact with arbitrators to discourage them from

68

The author observed this directly, as he was conducting research in Hainan,
Beijing, and Taipei in 2014-2015 and had the opportunity to conduct hundreds of
interviews with many of the scholars and think-tankers engaged in study and
advocacy surrounding the arbitration, attend some fifteen conferences on the
subject, and both teach and audit several law classes on UNCLOS at Tsinghua
University and Hainan University.
69
For a summary of this campaign, see Liu Zhen, Questions of Neutrality: China
Takes Aim at Judges in the South China Sea Case, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
(Jul.
11,
2016),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacydefence/article/1988119/questions-neutrality-china-takes-aim-judges-south-china
[https://perma.cc/KP9A-LMM8].
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unfavorable rulings, 70 impugning the motives of personnel
involved in the selection of arbitrators (articulated by a senior
MFA official),71 and a spate of impassioned presentations at
international law events denouncing the “wanton abuse of the law
of the sea.”72
This campaign achieved more than internal solidarity. A detailed
rebuttal to the SCS arbitration under the auspices of a Cambridge
University legal scholar marketed these arguments to a
sophisticated foreign audience. 73 The essays in that volume set
out several markers that reappear throughout the various
commentaries supporting PRC during this period and provide
some evidence of the tactics China employs to win converts to its
mode of interpreting international law. Other volumes assembled
foreign law of the sea experts, some of whom made arguments not
entirely along the lines of those endorsed by PRC officialdom, but
whose imprimatur gave the appearance of a credible legal debate
on whether or not the arbitration was indeed a lawful exercise.74
The upshot of these commentaries was the establishment of a
body of literature available to all interested that prescribes a far
narrower scope for UNCLOS-related jurisdiction than the field
The Republic of the Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility
71
Liu Zhenmin (刘振民), Zhongguo Bujieshou Feilübin Suoti Nanhai
Zhongcaian Wanquan Fuhe Guojifa (中国不接受菲律宾所提南海仲裁案完全
符合国际法) [China Does Not Accept that the Philippines’ Arbitration
Completely Conforms to International Law], QIUSHI [QSTHEORY] (Jul. 3, 2016),
http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-07/03/c_1119153268.htm
[https://perma.cc/Z7EG-5XXF]; News Analysis: Shunji Yanai, Manipulator
Behind Illegal South China Sea Arbitration, XINHUA (Jul. 17, 2016),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/17/c_135519215.htm
[https://perma.cc/T5X9-F3QC].
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Yee Sienho, Remarks at the American Society of International Law Annual
Conference
(Apr.
14,
2017)
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audio
available
at
https://www.asil.org/resources/audio/2017-annual-meeting
[https://perma.cc/R3D3-H8BW]).
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THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE (Stefan Talmon
& Bing Bing Jia eds., 2014).
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See e.g., ARBITRATION CONCERNING THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: PHILIPPINES
VERSUS CHINA (Wu Shicun & Zou Keyuan eds., 2016) (featuring articles by
Donald Rothwell, Ted McDorman, Robert Beckman, Sam Bateman, and other
well-recognized scholars of law of the sea issues).
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has typically recognized. The intent was to place the Convention
lower in the hierarchy of norms that bear on maritime order. If
“History” or general international law or customary international
law could be positioned as superior to the UNCLOS treaty, then
the impact of the inevitably unfavorable award might be
diminished.
The intensely political tenor of this campaign also lent credence to
the proposition that the arbitration was entirely political, and that
any decision that emerged from it was illegitimate.
In
conversation, the author has been told that the Japanese are behind
the case, that the U.S. State Department wrote the Philippines’
memorial to the tribunal, and that there is some vast conspiracy of
Western states to use international law to discredit China’s
sovereignty in the South China Sea. 75 These non-scholarly views
were widely circulated on several WeChat forums of Chinese
academics and enthusiasts.76 While these venues hosted plenty of
debate on just how illegal the arbitration was, only one set of
arguments overtly critical of PRC laws garnered any publicity,
delivered by a Chinese-born law professor working in Australia. 77
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Ji Mingkui(纪明葵), Nanhai Zhongcai Shi Xifang Daoyande Naoju (南海仲裁
是西方导演的闹剧) [The ‘SCS Arbitration’ is a Western-sponsored Farce],
QIUZU
W ANG
[QSTHEORY]
(Dec.
11,
2014),
http://www.qstheory.cn/international/2014-12/11/c_1113607463.htm
[https://perma.cc/XMY7-NEAZ].
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Wang Jiangyu (王江雨), Nanhai Zhongcaian: Guoji Zhengzhi, Guojifa Yu
Guojia Liyi (南海仲裁案:国际政治, 国际法与国家利益) [The SCS Arbitration:
International Politics, International Laws, and National Benefits], LIANHE
ZAOBAO
[UNION
MORNING
POST]
(Dec.
22,
2015),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MjM5MTc0NzI2Nw==&mid=401332148&id
x=1&sn=04600a80141f54a9e246dc147a93b6c5&scene=5&srcid=12227FgKIvOv
3JvWT0kqai6g#rd [https://perma.cc/EV98-7QY2].
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Ling Bing (凌兵) Weishenme Zhongguo Jujue Nanhai Zhongcai Yousun
Zhongguode Quanyi? (为什么中国拒绝南海仲裁有损中国的权益?) [Why Has
China’s Rejection of the South China Sea Arbitration Damaged China’s Rights
and Interests?], ZHONGMEI YINXIANG [US-CHINA PERCEPTION MONITOR] (Dec.
18,
2015),
http://www.uscnpm.com/model_item.html?action=view&table=article&id=7961
[https://perma.cc/H9HJ-3WZD]. These remarks were publicized by Julian Ku
after the award in Julian Ku, The Leaf Nation: China’s Legal Scholars Are Less
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With these arguments intact and circulating throughout the expert
community, PRC diplomats began to recruit states to announce that
they, too, did not accept the arbitration. Presumably linking
opposition to some consequence, China was able to solicit clear
statements from five states that they opposed the ruling:
Montenegro, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan, Taiwan78, and Vanuatu.79
This is not an overwhelming group, though in number it is
comparable to those willing to directly and explicitly support the
SCS arbitration: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the
Philippines, the U.S., and Vietnam. China’s MFA claimed that over
sixty states had joined PRC’s cause in opposing the ruling,
employing an unusual counting method that included states who
merely expressed support for China’s principle of resolving disputes
through consultation and dialogue. 80 Commenting to reporters on
this outpouring of purported support, an MFA spokesman
maintained that international support for the Chinese position was
itself a resounding affirmation of the rule of law. PRC was
defending the integrity of the system against those states (i.e., the
Philippines) that “break rules and undermine international rule of
law under the excuse of ostensibly ‘upholding the rule.’” 81
He added that this support also reflects “affirm[ation] that the
sovereign disputes over relevant islands and reefs in the South
Credible After the South China Sea Ruling, FOREIGN POLICY, (July 14, 2016),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/14/south-china-sea-lawyers-unclos-beijinglegal-tribunal/ [https://perma.cc/4MVV-ZX9J].
78
Taiwan is not formally a state. It also bears noting that Taiwan’s opposition
came not because of Chinese efforts to discredit the award, but because Taiwan
bristled at being excluded from observing the proceedings because it is not a
member UNCLOS III because of PRC opposition. Republic of China Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, ROC Position on the South China Sea Arbitration (Jul. 12,
2016),
https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=1EADDCFD4C6EC567&s=
5B5A9134709EB875 [https://perma.cc/ZYJ9-6UE3].
79
Greg Poling, Arbitration Support Tracker, Asia Mar. Transparency Initiative
(June
16,
2016),
https://amti.csis.org/arbitration-support-tracker/
[https://perma.cc/GZ9V-SSK5].
80
Lu Kang(陆慷), Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Regular Press Conference,
P.R.C.
MINISTRY
OF
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
(June
14,
2016),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1
372136.shtml [https://perma.cc/K4NJ-DYQP].
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China Sea shall be properly resolved through friendly negotiation by
parties directly concerned on the basis of respecting historical facts
and international law.”82 This construction—the juxtaposition of
international law and history—is of paramount importance to a full
understanding of the Chinese view on the appropriate scope and
reach of international legal norms.
UNCLOS, from this perspective, is not the exclusive source of law
on maritime issues. Chinese interlocutors frequently point to the
customary international law of territorial acquisition as a basis for
their claims to sovereignty over South China Sea features. China’s
acquisitive actions predate the Convention itself, and therefore
should not be regulated by it under a doctrine of “intertemporal law”
(时际法).83 Corollary to this argument is the claim that there are
different bodies of law that are equally if not more valid, and that
must be balanced against UNCLOS rules.84 Following this
reasoning, the questions of China’s “historical” rights to resources
or jurisdiction in the SCS flow from an entirely different legal
regime.85
The reams of tendentious historical “research”
commissioned by PRC institutions during this period all point
unwaveringly in this direction. In official communications, PRC

82
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Mu Caijia (母彩佳), Woguo Dui Zhongfei Nanhai Zhongcaiande Lichang Ji
Yiju (我国对中菲南海仲裁案的立场及依据) [Our Country’s Position and Basis
on the Sino-Philippines South China Sea Arbitration], 10 FAZHI YU SHEHUI
[LEGAL SYS. & SOC’Y], 132-33 (2017).
84
Luo Guoqiang (罗国强), Nanhai Zhongcaian Chubu Caijue Pingxi], (南海仲裁
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案初步裁决评析) [Analysis of the Initial Award in the South China Sea
Arbitration], HEXUN WANG (Mar. 24, 2016), http://opinion.hexun.com/2016-0324/182934912.html [https://perma.cc/2PUV-7J78]; Bing Bing Jia, The Principle
of the Domination of the Land over the Sea: A Historical Perspective on the
Adaptability of the Law of the Sea to New Challenges, 57 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 1,
1–32 (2014).
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Hong Nong, Post-Arbitration South China Sea: China’s Legal Policy Options
and
Future
Prospects,
(Apr.
2017),
https://storage.googleapis.com/scstt/publications/South-China-Sea-Lawfare2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/48BG-KCJL].
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cites its “abundant historical and legal evidence” 86 and publishes it
frequently in official media and academic presses. 87
The commentary from PRC officials, academics, and like-minded
voices collectively advanced the two broader arguments detailed
above: (1) that the arbitration is a political exercise designed to
subvert China’s sovereignty, and therefore China’s actions
actually uphold the legal order of the oceans; and (2) that the
Convention is too narrow to rule on questions of sovereignty and
history. Taken together, these yield the preferred Chinese
solution: sideline UNCLOS and engage in bilateral consultation
and dialogue. Following the publication of the award, this
prescription has come to dominate Chinese diplomacy and
scholarship on the subject of the South China Sea.
III: “A Piece of Waste Paper”
The July 12, 2016 publication of the tribunal’s final “Award” 88
was breathtaking in scope and ambition, far surpassing the
expectations of the law of the sea community. Not only did the
tribunal find its way to jurisdiction on all of the outstanding
Philippines’s claims, but it also went much further than expected
in pronouncing China’s “nine-dashed line” invalid as a claim to
resource rights.
Additionally, the tribunal established a
demanding new test for determining the status of islands; applying
it to the Spratlys, they determined that none of the features—not
those occupied by China nor those of any other claimant—were
sufficient to warrant status as a full island entitled to an EEZ and
continental shelf. Two of the seven PRC-occupied features in the
Spratlys were even determined to be low-tide elevations (Subi and
Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale,
CML/8/2011
(Apr.
14,
2011),
available
from
DOALOS
at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_201
1_re_phl_e.pdf [].
87
Pounding the table at academic and think-tank conferences on this count is de
rigueur.
88
See generally Republic of the Phil. v. China., No. 2013-19, Award (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 2016), http://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN%20-%2020160712%20%20Award.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT4K-FWXR] (detailing the contents of the
“Award”).
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Mischief Reefs), and thus not lawfully subject to a claim of
sovereignty—despite impressive Chinese facilities constructed
atop those submerged features.
Immediately after the award was released, the MFA published a
statement on the award, recapping their prior objections and
pronouncing the PRC policy on the matter. It stated that “PRC
solemnly declares that the award is null and void and has no
binding force,” and consequently, “China neither accepts nor
recognizes it.”89 In comments to the press, MFA Vice-Minister
Liu Zhenmin pronounced the Award as “just a piece of waste
paper.”90 PRC officials largely omitted comment on the matter as
the Philippines’s new administration vowed not to seek
enforcement and parroted Liu’s “piece of [waste] paper” comment
as justification for their disinterest in discussing the award. 91
PRC’s subsequent practice and diplomacy offer some indications
of the ways in which China aims to shape the law of the sea
regime moving forward. After a brief summary of the Award, this
section turns to China’s reactions and what they reveal about the
characteristics of Chinese influence on UNCLOS.
The Tribunal’s Ambitious Award

89

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China
on the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea
Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines, XINHUA
(Jul. 12, 2016), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/12/c_135507744.htm
[https://perma.cc/N3RV-P4QY].
90
Speech, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Vice
Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin at the Press Conference on the White Paper Titled
China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant
Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea (Jul. 13,
2013),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1381980.shtml
[https://perma.cc/HP4C-KFNT].
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Benjamin Kang Lim, Philippines Duterte Says South China Sea Arbitration
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REUTERS
(Oct.
19,
2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines/philippines-duterte-sayssouth-china-sea-arbitration-case-to-take-back-seat-idUSKCN12J10S
[https://perma.cc/9S4W-BNMR].
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A key finding about the status of islands in the South China Sea
enabled the tribunal to decide on all of the other issues. Namely,
in finding that none of the features in the South China Sea can be
considered “islands” under the definition offered in the
Convention, the arbitrators cleared the central obstruction to
ruling on the Philippines’s other submissions. En route to this
decision, the arbitrators wrestled with the indeterminacy of the
rule, laid out in the black letters of Article 121(3), which state,
“[r]ocks[,] which cannot sustain human habitation or economic
life of their own[,] shall have no exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf.”92 Because these terms are not defined
elsewhere in the treaty, nor dealt with in any depth in
jurisprudence, the arbitrators go to comical lengths to define each
of the scarce words in this definition, and settle on a highly
rigorous test for determining whether a feature can be considered
a full-fledged island.93 None of the features under consideration
meet these stringent requirements, which hinge on a
demonstrated, empirical record of human habitation and economic
use.94
Because China had been exercising its jurisdiction in the form of
maritime law enforcement in areas surrounding these features that
are not entitled to EEZ rights, this decision on the status of islands
clears the way for a determination that those PRC practices are
unlawful. The lack of additional entitlements allowed the tribunal
to remain agnostic about sovereignty claims while finding that
China’s claims to exclusive or non-exclusive rights to resources
(primarily fish and hydrocarbons) were illegal in areas beyond the
territorial seas of the disputed features. Perhaps more damaging,
several of the features were determined to be incapable of
sovereign possession because they lay under water at high tide
and thus are properly classified as “low-tide elevations” (LTEs).
This determination is especially problematic in the case of the
92

Law of the Sea Convention art. 121(3), Dec. 10, 1982, UNCLOS III.
Republic of the Phil. v. China., No. 2013-19, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016),
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poetically-justly-named “Mischief Reef,” which the award
determined to be a low-tide elevation that lies on the continental
shelf—and thus within the jurisdiction—of the Philippines. The
presence of a large artificial island on this feature, constructed by
PRC, further complicates this mischievous reef’s status.
Several other elements of the award make somewhat more diffuse
demands on China, preemptively disqualifying several policies or
practices that PRC might see fit to undertake in the South China
Sea. Most significant among them is the decision that the “ninedashed line” is not a valid claim to maritime rights. The
arbitrators concluded that “China’s claims to historic rights, or
other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime
areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of
the ‘nine-dashed line’ are contrary to the Convention and without
lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and
substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the
Convention.”95 Read alongside the ruling on entitlements, this
decision means that China’s lawful rights and jurisdiction in the
South China Sea can be no more than twelve nautical miles from
any of the features, pending settlement on their underlying
sovereignty.
The Award goes even further in preemptively ruling out any
possible Chinese efforts to claim broader entitlements, expressly
denying the possibility of establishing “archipelagic baselines”
around groups of islands in the SCS, which might collectively rate
a status as a full-fledged island. Reading the black letters of the
Convention in Article 47, the Award makes a special point of
denying the legality of any kind of archipelagic claim from PRC
because it is not an archipelagic state as defined in Article 46. 96
While no question was posed by the Philippines to this effect, the
tribunal here is struggling to head off efforts by China to subvert
the ruling by pursuing claims that are not expressly outlawed.

Award, “Dispositif,” Part B, Section (2), 473.
Republic of the Phil. v. China., No. 2013-19, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016),
http://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN%20-%2020160712%20%20Award.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT4K-FWXR].
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Another preemptive move in the Award concerns China’s muchpublicized artificial islands, replete with fighter and bomber
aircraft-capable runways, hardened defensive facilities, weapons
emplacements, and radar. 97 The Philippines sought relief on the
basis of extensive environmental damage wrought by construction
of these islands. The tribunal heard substantial expert testimony
about the environmental damage caused by PRC dredging and
reclamation efforts in building up these non-islands, and found
PRC in breach of its obligations to protect and conserve the
natural environment, as established in UNCLOS.
Further
construction has been in direct contravention of the award.98
A further set of decisions concerns unsafe navigational practices
by Chinese maritime law enforcement and fishing vessels,
violations of UNCLOS and another set of international standards
referenced in UNCLOS, the 1972 Convention on the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs). The
China Coast Guard has periodically engaged in risky seamanship,
including ramming, near-misses, use of water cannons, and so on.
Further action in this vein will be in breach of the award.
China’s Response: So What?
The award’s unequivocal demands on PRC of course beg the
question “so what?” After all, PRC had spent the better part of
four years announcing its total rejection for the arbitration,
asserting that they would not implement the award even if it were
to turn out favorably. No enforcement mechanisms exist in
UNCLOS, and the Philippines would be hard-pressed to insist on
full implementation even if their government were so inclined.
However, the tremendous volume of PRC diplomatic energy
expended throughout the procedure is a clear indication that
97

The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative has effectively publicized this
island-building campaign using open-sourced satellite data, which it frequently
updates to monitor China’s construction. Note their “Island Tracker” at
https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/.
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Center for Strategic & International Studies, A Constructive Year For Chinese
Base Building, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-chinese-building/ [https://perma.cc/WCP9VVBN].
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China’s leadership perceived some significant costs associated
with the arbitration. Their response to the award demonstrates
more than just defiance of the award; it is a bid to shape the future
“interpretation and application” of the law of the sea in ways that
permit far greater leeway for sovereign states to define their own
rights and jurisdiction.
The immediate response from the MFA, released on the day of the
award, reprises many of the specific objections to the Philippines
case, and then closes with a single paragraph that encapsulates
each of the arguments analyzed above:
The Chinese government reiterates that, regarding
territorial [sovereignty] issues and maritime
delimitation disputes, China does not accept any
means of third party dispute settlement or any
solution imposed on China.
The Chinese
government will continue to abide by
international law and basic norms governing
international relations as enshrined in the Charter
of the United Nations, including the principles of
respecting state sovereignty and territorial
integrity and peaceful settlement of disputes, and
continue to work with states directly concerned to
resolve the relevant disputes in the South China
Sea through negotiations and consultations on the
basis of respecting historical facts and in
accordance with international law, so as to
maintain peace and stability in the South China
Sea.99

This statement epitomizes China’s dogmatic emphasis on the
inviolability of its sovereignty and consequent inadmissibility of
third-party decisions without its consent. It highlights the political
instrumentality of the Philippines’s use of international law. It
mounts vague appeals to indeterminate principles rather than
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Statement on the
Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea
Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines (Jul. 12,
2016),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1379492.htm
[https://perma.cc/NB24-S47B].
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concrete rules. Finally, it asserts that solutions can be reached only
by “respecting historical facts and in accordance with international
law,”100 tacitly subjugating norms of international law to a Chinese
interpretation of history. China’s consistency on these principles
warrants close attention, and foreshadows their subsequent practice.
The following day, July 13, 2016, the PRC State Council released
a White Paper entitled “China Adheres to the Position of Settling
Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and
the Philippines in the South China Sea.” 101 Liu Zhenmin spoke on
the release of the White Paper, further denigrating the award:
“[i]ts composition is obviously problematic, and it has no
representativeness, authority nor credibility and cannot represent
international law at all. Therefore, its award is surely illegal and
invalid.”102 This senior official’s statement rehashes known
objections to the award and introduces a document that began a
process of posing a Chinese alternative to the UNCLOS dispute
resolution process. This authoritative White Paper on the subject
of the South China Sea is the first of its kind and represents the
state of the art in Beijing’s thinking about its claims in these
disputed waters. Importantly for our efforts to understand China’s
relationship with international law, it indicates some of the key
lines of effort in China’s efforts to shape the law of the sea
regime.
Recognizing the inconvenience of a determinate ruling against
China’s central claim, the White Paper goes a considerable way
towards decoupling the nine-dashed line from the substance of
100
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White Paper, The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China
Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes
Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea (Jul. 13, 2016),
http://english.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2016/07/13/content_281475392503
075.htm [https://perma.cc/62AU-9Z58].
102
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Chinese claims to extraordinary rights and jurisdiction throughout
the South China Sea. Despite its continued prominence on PRC
maps (and, inferentially, its geographic relevance to ongoing PRC
law enforcement and economic activities throughout the disputed
region), the nine-dashed line was not presented as the central
element of Chinese claims to rights and jurisdiction. By
separately listing these entitlement claims, the “historic rights”
claim, and the “nine-dashed line” claim, China is implicitly
acknowledging the legal weaknesses of the nine-dashed line—
predictably confirmed by the Award—and charting a new course
to redefine the criteria under which maritime zones may be
established under UNCLOS. By contrast to the purely negative
statements produced throughout the protracted arbitration process,
this is a positive statement of intent—not an intent to honor the
award, but rather to avoid making claims that are plainly
contradicted by it. The White Paper marks a step toward a new
agenda by spelling out the lawful bases of Chinese activities in
these disputed waters in mostly recognizable legal terms.
Indeed, the White Paper goes to great lengths to spell out the basis
under a distinctive interpretation of UNCLOS for China’s rights
and jurisdiction. This argument is complemented by one of the
more abundant official recitations of evidence documenting the
accretion of Chinese authority over the islands and maritime
spaces “in the long course of history . . . as early as the 2nd century
BCE in the Western Han Dynasty.” 103 This history-trumps-law
tack is not new, but represents a decisive break from prior
statements, which do not articulate the specific evidence China
believes to be dispositive in the case. It also marks the beginning
of an ongoing groundswell in academic research on various arcane
subjects in the law of the sea, especially historic rights and
archipelagic waters, in which Chinese experts endeavor to identify
the indeterminacies and gaps in UNCLOS that might be exploited
by clever Chinese legal claims to expand the aperture for the
exercise of rights and jurisdiction.
A prominent example came in an article, published the following
week in the military’s flagship newspaper, which begins with a
103
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categorical statement of the insufficiency of UNCLOS:
“UNCLOS did not provide rules for the issue of territorial sea
baselines for continental countries’ archipelagos; nor did it
provide rules for historic rights, although it affirmed their status in
international law.”104 The authors, led by the Deputy Director of
the Chinese Communist Party’s influential Central Party School,
Wang Jumin, go on to suggest that China’s historic rights claims
have been horribly misconstrued by the Award and can be easily
reconciled with international law because they do not amount to
an exclusive claim to economic rights within the waters of the
South China Sea. They begin to parse the various types of rights
that are possible, including navigational rights, fishing rights, and
law enforcement rights, then go some way towards articulating
how China can use archipelagic baselines to claim some of these.
Subsequent Chinese scholarship has picked up some of these
themes and run with them. Some of these efforts undertake in an
exhaustive analysis of the practices of other states to suggest that
there is indeed a precedent for claims, such as those to a
“geographic unity” composed of tiny islets, reefs and rocks, that
could justify some kind of “archipelagic baseline” claim. 105 These
are all efforts that bear close scrutiny, representing clear examples
of China’s commitment to generating new customary international
norms through consistent practice.
In forwarding such creative interpretations at the seams in
UNCLOS III, Chinese authors are trying to socialize their foreign
counterparts to some plausible new norms. The mere fact that
these ideas are originating in China, with Chinese scholars
104
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attempting to socialize the rest of the world to them, is an epochal
change to the past pattern. At least one of these efforts has even
been applauded for representing partial “compliance” with the
award:106 PRC’s concession to Filipino fishermen’s “traditional
fishing activities” around the Scarborough Shoal. Given that
China is increasingly seeking to characterize its own fishing
activities as “traditional fishing rights” (as in the “southwest
fishing grounds” in the area near Indonesia’s Natuna Islands), 107
there are reasons to view this limited concession as an attempt to
establish a precedent for fishing in the territorial seas and other
jurisdictional waters of neighboring states. That the Chinese
Coast Guard has maintained a close cordon on the shoal and can
unilaterally reverse this limited concession to the Philippines
should also be borne in mind. Already the tenuous nature of this
“compliance” is evident: Philippine vessels have been prohibited
from operating near the shoal during PRC’s unilateral summer
fishing moratorium.108
Since the award, the thrust of PRC diplomatic efforts in Southeast
Asia has been to re-introduce the “charm” into the once-vaunted
“charm offensive” it mounted in the region in the mid-2000s.109
One of the central themes of this newly gracious approach has
been the swift conclusion of a “Code of Conduct” for the South
China Sea disputes, the long-awaited and perhaps legally-binding
culmination of the effort commenced with the 2002 DOC. One of
the proposals being socialized by Chinese diplomats is for parties
to forego any discussion of areas within the twelve nautical miles
territorial seas of the features, and treat all the areas beyond those
zones as some sort of common pool resource with a joint
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development scheme for fisheries and hydrocarbons. 110 Such
innovative proposals illustrate the creative energy PRC is now
devoting to shaping the law of the sea regime to suit its interests
and is doing so with some clear, substantive goals in mind. That
these discussions have proceeded without the other claimants
being able to insist on rigorous adherence to the award is a distinct
signal that alternative norms and values are viable in this region.
China’s exponentially greater capacity to use and administer
resources under any such agreement guarantees that any joint
management of these areas will be dominated by Chinese vessels
and aircraft, and likely managed by Chinese firms.
IV: International Law Is Dead! Long Live International Law!
What are the legal and political consequences of this action for
China, for UNCLOS, for international dispute resolution, and for
international law? Beijing’s implicit goal was to undermine this
specific arbitration and deter future unwelcome legal infringement
on what China considers to be its sovereign prerogatives. The
central lines of PRC efforts have been to reframe the case as an
instance of deliberate abuse of UNCLOS in service of political
aims, to minimize the scope of issues on which UNCLOS is treated
as the authoritative set of rules and norms, and to promote bilateral
diplomatic alternatives to third-party dispute resolution. If these
positions were to gain broad international acceptance, the upshot
would be a radical diminution of the effectiveness of ocean
governance under the law of the sea regime. Is there a different,
Chinese-preferred mode of ocean governance apparent in this
strategy? Or is there simply a reversion to the diverse domestic
laws and practices of coastal states, untethered from onerous
international legal obligations?
At present, only preliminary judgments are possible about the
effects of the arbitration and China’s extraordinary actions to
undermine it. The overarching question concerns the influence
China will have over the law of the sea regime, and maritime
order generally, as it seeks to press forward with its maritime
110

Versions of this proposal have been discussed with the author by MFA
contacts in January and July 2017.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss2/1

2018]

43

claims in the wake of a ruling that profoundly discredits some of
the key pillars on which they stand.
Three concluding
observations stand out as appropriate for our consideration at
present.
First, the sheer volume of diplomatic efforts devoted to
pronouncing China to be the state properly upholding UNCLOS
and international law should be sufficient to indicate that Beijing
has no intention of entirely discarding the law of the sea regime.
Rather, we observe a far more subtle process of selectively
adopting elements of UNCLOS III and forging them with
elements of China’s domestic law and policy. This process
amounts to “creeping jurisdiction,” wherein the steady
accumulation of domestic laws and practices in zones with hazily
defined rights and jurisdiction can lead to a net increase in coastal
state authority over those maritime zones. By rejecting the
arbitral proceeding but, paradoxically, wrapping itself in the
mantle of international law, China is charting a course in which its
participation—at scale and with defined goals based on its
interests—can shape the way other states practice UNCLOS.
How this has transpired is a question left open to future research,
though it bears noting that many of the states along the Asian
littoral share some Chinese views about coastal state authority
(albeit not the nine-dashed line) that the United States deems to be
“excessive maritime claims.” 111
China’s views on coastal state authority need not become
recognized as a global norm for them to bring about systemic
effects. It would be sufficient for other states to simply acquiesce
to a regional custom (perhaps one authorized in a code of conduct,
though not necessarily). Such an outcome would not immediately
undermine UNCLOS, but would radically degrade its uniformity
across the world’s oceans. However grudging, international
acceptance of a special set of Chinese excessive claims would
create a precedent for other states and regional groupings to
develop non-uniform practices. It would become more difficult
for courts or arbitral panels to deny the validity of plural
111
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interpretations of important norms. Such fragmentation of the
global law of the sea regime may already be underway, a
countervailing tendency to the ambitious dreams of UNCLOS
drafters to realize a “constitution for the oceans.”
At present, the Chinese alternative is not fully recognizable
because it is limited to the region and inextricably bound up with
maritime disputes that do not exist elsewhere. Still, China is
actively marketing its version of sea law to many states outside of
the North Atlantic. Many would not quickly sacrifice other
economic and political interests—over which China has growing
interest—for the sake of upholding a liberal and relatively open
maritime domain. China has shown considerable deftness (if not
subtlety) in its coercive economic statecraft, 112 and it is hardly
speculative to expect that such disincentives could be presented to
states that resist. Beijing’s ready invocation of “sovereignty” as a
means to diminish the penetration of international norms into the
domestic sphere has considerable appeal in states throughout the
developing world, especially those with non-democratic
governments.
This hyper-sovereigntist cause was initially weak during the postcold war era, a period in which a relatively liberal mode of
interpreting major international conventions like UNCLOS was in
ascendance. However, the PRC is increasingly sophisticated and
motivated in its attempts to establish norms that will permit states
to carve out greater autonomy within an international system that
has evolved to provide legal justification for universal jurisdiction
in a variety of domains, from humanitarian interventions, to
human rights, to environmental protection and conservation.
Second, much has been made of China’s vested interest in free
navigation throughout the South China Sea. Because of its heavy
trade dependence and concentration of major commercial centers
on its far eastern periphery, China is uniquely vulnerable to trade
disruptions and unlikely to support any systemic restrictions on
Evan A. Feigenbaum, “Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic
Statecraft?,” MacroPolo (Jul. 25 2017), https://macropolo.org/coercion-newnormal-chinas-economic-statecraft/ [https://perma.cc/C3BL-ZCMZ].
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maritime traffic. The fact that some 90% of global trade transits
via maritime routes, however, is no bar on China’s efforts to
promote a less liberal interpretation of the law of the sea regime.
The norms that underpin this system—namely, a deference to user
state rights over those of coastal states and a presumption that
navigation is free in the absence of recognized jurisdiction—are
neither inevitable nor immutable.
Even if China is
disproportionately dependent on its maritime trade and certainly
has no interest in a global constriction of container and tanker
traffic, there is also no a priori reason to think China will not
continue to press its local advantages to control and administer all
navigation in its “near seas.” The impressive expansion of
China’s coast guard capacity and the global reach of the People’s
Liberation Army Navy are among the sources of power that China
can employ to limit its vulnerability. Arguably, China’s primary
vulnerability is to American sea power, so carving out some legal
restrictions on U.S. navy access appears to be a cheap and dirty
way to achieve some of this security without engaging in full-on
confrontation.
It is a past due observation that China has not been socialized into
thinking that the existing order is the best order. If Chinese
maritime capabilities continue to advance, as seems highly likely,
commercial navigation can remain unfettered while other areas of
user state rights and interests are restricted (e.g., resource
exploitation, military navigation, scientific research). This would
be a non-uniform and perhaps dysfunctional evolution in the law
of the sea regime, as there is neither Chinese capacity nor intent to
defend other states’ interests in similarly asserting coastal state
rights. Based on the current trajectory, Chinese influence appears
to be diminishing the relative importance of global norms
embodied in treaties and elevating the priorities of individual
sovereigns to interpret UNCLOS according to their rights and to
seek to control and administer maritime space in line with their
domestic law.
Finally, this arbitration is not the final Chinese statement on legal
dispute resolution. While there are few reasons to think PRC will
abandon a long-standing principle of preferring bilateral
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“negotiation and consultation” to third party adjudication, there
are many reasons to think it is adaptive. The case of China’s
practice in WTO dispute resolution is one example, though
perhaps inapposite because the large volume of relatively trivial
cases in that arena do not resemble the large, and (arguably)
sovereignty-related stakes of maritime arbitration. Nonetheless,
there are a host of UNCLOS issues on which China has relatively
minor disputes with neighbors on which China may consent to
arbitration, if only to shore up its status as a good faith party to
UNCLOS. Challenging Japan’s claim to an EEZ and continental
shelf surrounding Okino-tori is one possibility proposed by some
Chinese law of the sea specialists.
Alternatively, China has already dealt a major blow to the
institution’s functionality. If awards can be easily sloughed off,
and further, denigrated as unlawful themselves, there may be a
chilling effect on other attempts to launch arbitral processes. This
single case will not be fatal for the efficacy of that mechanism, but
it establishes a precedent that may become corrosive in the event
of other suits against China. It also goes towards explaining some
of the “dogs that don’t bark”—namely, Vietnam’s reluctance to
seek arbitration on similar issues in its disputes with China in the
South China Sea. If fewer states believe that legal dispute
resolution mechanisms can be used effectively, they will wither.
Less dramatically, if China has established a higher bar for
jurisdiction and admissibility of cases that plausibly touch on
maritime delimitation, the compulsory dispute system may simply
fall into relative disuse.
The Chinese response to the South China Sea arbitration has set
an important, if still uncertain, precedent for future practice.
Backed up by impressive capacity and enabled by a less robust
international legal environment that lacks energetic American
enforcement of key norms, China is primed to externalize its
distinctive approach to international law into the wider
international legal arena. We should remain highly attuned to
China’s subsequent practice as it bears on the South China Sea
arbitral award, and perhaps even more so to the ways in which its
practices influence those of other states in the region and beyond.
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